In his recent paper, “What a Real Argument is”, Ben Hamby attempts to provide an adequate theoretical account of “real” arguments. In this paper I present and evaluate both Hamby’s motivation for distinguishing “real” from non-“real” arguments and his articulation of the distinction. I argue that neither is adequate to ground a theoretically significant class of “real” arguments, for the articulation fails to pick out a stable proper subclass of all arguments that is simultaneously both theoretically relevant and a proper (...) subclass of all arguments. (shrink)

G. C. J. Midgley; XIV—Linguistic Rules, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 271–290, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristot.

To anyone who has been engaged in teaching and studying Plato, particularly the Republic , for the last thirty or forty years, one fact must stand out with special prominence. That is the remarkable increase during that period of the direct applicability of Plato's discussions to our own problems. Thirty-five years ago the concrete situations which Plato had in mind in these discussions, the general assumptions at the back of them, the possibilities for good or evil that he envisaged, would (...) all seem to the student of that time remote and almost unreal, and it required a considerable exercise of the imagination to discover that there were certain underlying ideas in them which had application to our own time. If we wanted contemporary illustrations of the rise of a tyrant we had to turn to some of the most backward States in South America. The idea of a completely planned society existed only in the minds of the writers of Utopias, to whom we were accustomed, sometimes, to say rather patronizingly that they had forgotten that constitutions, grow and are not made. We could study the criticisms of democracy as an intellectual exercise without any feeling that they might be one day applied in practice. How different is the situation now! Many of the possibilities are as near for us as they were to Plato. Many of the general ideas of Plato's day are as readily assumed by us as they were by him. Indeed the difficulty now is greater in trying to gain a sympathetic hearing for the ideas of thirty or forty years ago than for the ideas of the fourth century b.c. (shrink)

Is it possible for an argument to have either zero premises or an infinite number of premises? I shall argue that regardless of how you conceive of arguments you should accept that an argument could have an infinite number of premises. The zero case is more complicated since the matter seems to depend not only on the metaphysics of arguments, but also the nature and function of arguing. I shall argue that at least a plausible case can be made for (...) the possibility of zero premise arguments. (shrink)

Dr. Leaf's article in the Journal of Hellenic Studies has recalled our attention to the venerable problem of the Rhesus. I hasten to give my adhesion to his main contention that the play is a pièce d'occasion justifying or sanctifying the foundation of the city of Amphipolis. But, as he remarks, seeing that the oracle ordering the removal of the bones of Theseus from Skyros to Athens preceded the actual removal by some years, so this play may be intended to (...) prepare for the actual removal of the bones of Rhesus from Troy by Hagnon, and may be prior to it by several years. For this official theft—doubtless arranged beforehand—we have only the authority of Polyainos' Strategemata, but it is a story which seems likely in itself, and goes far to explain the previously obscure lament of the Muse at the end of the play. My object is to examine the play afresh and see whether anything prevents our believing that it was written and exhibited somewhere near 440 B.C., in which case of course it is almost certainly the work of Euripides and not far from his Cyclops in date. (shrink)

I must begin by apologizing for taking a somewhat well-worn subject for my theme. My reason is that I have not yet found a recent treatment of it which is altogether to my satisfaction. Most of them seem to me too often to approach the subject from a point of view which, in a way, expects too much from the study of Plato or any other ancient author, and consequently either makes exaggerated claims for it or fails to do justice (...) to what we really can learn. (shrink)

George Bowles and Thomas Gilbert claim that illatives such as so, therefore, and hence convey the meaning that the premise confers upon the conclusion a probability greater than 1/2. This claim is false, for there are straightforward uses of these illatives that do not convey the meaning that the probability is greater than 1/2. In addition, because Bowles' and Gilbert's claim is false, a revision of their definition of argument is required.

There has been much discussion about what, if any, legal and moral duties professionals have to disclose relevant genetic information to the family members of someone with an identified disease predisposing mutation. Here, we present a case report where dissemination of such a genetic test result did not take place within a family. In contrast to previous literature, there appeared to be no deliberate withholding of information, instead distant relatives were unable to communicate relevant information appropriately. When communication was facilitated (...) through the follow-up of a chance remark, the patient was able to avoid planned major surgery, with its attendant morbidity, and her high anxiety levels were much reduced. We believe this case highlights the need for an ongoing debate on how genetic services can best support patients and their families with disclosing relevant genetic information to other family members. (shrink)

Decision-making is an intricate subject in neuroscience. It is often argued that laboratorial research is not capable of dealing with the necessary complexity to study the issue. Whereas philosophers in general neglect the physiological features that constitute the main aspects of thought and behaviour, I advocate that cutting-edge neuroscientific experiments can offer us a framework to explain human behaviour in its relationship with will, self-control, inhibition, emotion and reasoning. It is my contention that self-control mechanisms can modulate more basic stimuli. (...) Assuming the aforementioned standpoints, I show the physiological mechanisms underlying social assessment and decision-making. I also establish a difference between veridical and adaptive decision-making, useful to create experimental designs that can better mimic the complexity of our day-by-day decisions in more ecologically relevant laboratorial research. Moreover, I analyse some experiments in order to develop an epistemological reflection about the necessary neural mechanisms to social assessment and decision-making. (shrink)

David Hitchcock, in his recent “Informal Logic and the Concept of Argument”, defends a recursive definition of ‘argument.’ I present and discuss several problems that arise for his definition. I argue that refining Hitchcock’s definition in order to resolve these problems reveals a crucial, but minimally explicated, relation that was, at best, playing an obscured role in the original definition or, at worst, completely absent from the original definition.